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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between ownership structures and IPO 
long-run performance of non-SOEs in China. Although non-SOEs underperform the 
market in general after IPO but the poor performance is mainly caused by the IPOs 
with ownership control wedge. Non-SOEs with one share one vote structure 
outperform those with control-ownership wedge by 30% for three years post-IPO 
performance in adjusted buy-and-hold returns. Non-SOEs with control-ownership 
wedge have higher frequency of undertaking value-destroying related party 
transactions. These findings suggest that non-SOEs need to improve corporate 
governance such as disproportionate ownership structure to better safeguard the interest 
of long-run shareholders. 
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 1. Introduction 
Initial Public Offering (IPO)’s performance has important implications for public 
investors. IPO literature has clearly documented the phenomenon of pervasive long-run 
IPO underperformance. The literature (Ritter 1991; Loughran & Ritter 1995) shows 
that IPO stocks on a 3-5 year horizon underperforms the market or matching firms. Jain 
and Kini (1994) and Mikkelson et al. (1997) find that IPO firms experience a decline in 
their post-issue operating performance. Pagano et al. (1998) attribute the post-IPO fall 
in profitability to the window opportunity hypothesis when entrepreneurs want to take 
advantage of market timing.  
 In this paper, we examine whether the difference in ownership structure at firm 
level can explain IPO long-run (under) performance in China. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) point out that large owners gain major control of the corporation and extract 
private benefits. Large shareholders often prefer disproportionate ownership structure 
in which their control rights are much greater than cash flow rights in emerging 
markets. Such disproportionate ownership structure becomes a major channel to 
facilitate expropriation of minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2002; Lins, 2000; 
Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Bae et al., 2012; Liu and Tian, 
2012). These empirical studies document a negative association between firm 
value/performance and disproportionate ownership structure in non-IPO contexts. Yeh 
et al. (2008) study IPO first-day return and disproportionate ownership structure in 
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Taiwan. Different from all these studies, we investigate IPO long-run performance in 
association with disproportionate ownership structure in China.  
Post-IPO’s secondary market is important place for most small and public 
investors to trade IPO firms. Many IPO underwriting process favors institutional 
investors so that small investor can only buy hot IPOs after they are traded. It is thus 
relevant to understand IPO long-run performance. On the other hand, IPO market 
offers an ideal place to investigate the causality between performance that is observed 
ex post and ownership structure ex ante. Most studies on ownership and performance 
are subject to endogeneity problem since they are jointly determined. We hypothesize 
that IPO firms with disproportionate ownership structure in the IPO day 1  will 
underperform other IPO firms in the long run due to the expropriation by controlling 
shareholders. We not only examine IPO’s long-run stock performance using 
cross-sectional approaches, but also report the change of operating performance 
post-IPO. Furthermore, we try to understand the channels through which 
disproportionate ownership decrease long-run post-IPO performance. 
We take advantage of Chinese IPO market for the following reasons. First, as other 
emerging markets, China’s corporate governance system and investor protection are 
weak for small shareholders due to weak institutions. One implication is that the 
entrenchment effects of a disproportionate ownership structure are likely to be 
1 Using the disproportionate ownership structure of the first day of IPO helps to eliminate the endogeneity issue 
because shares held by large controlling shareholders usually have a lock-up period of at least 36 months, which 
make the controlling shareholders are not able to change the disproportionate ownership structure during the long 
lock-up period. 
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pronounced in this market. Second, small retail investors actively investing in Chinese 
IPOs are naïve ones, which means IPO long-run performance is critical. Third, equity 
market provides a critical source of external financing for non-government owned 
firms, which comprise the majority of IPOs during the recent years. Most of firms in 
China are characterized with a concentrated and disproportionate ownership structure. 
Our findings therefore have general implications of ownership structure and IPO firm 
performance in countries with weak institutions.  
We utilize a comprehensive sample of non-SOEs, and the sample includes 636 IPO 
companies listing between 2002 and 2010. SOEs are excluded in this research 
primarily because (1) SOEs in China have different objectives and principal–agent 
framework, compared to the non-SOEs, so the main agency issue in SOEs is agency 
conflict between the shareholders and managers rather than between controlling 
shareholders and minority shareholders (Rousseau and Xiao, 2007; Liu and Tian, 2012); 
(2) Although SOEs may also have a disproportionate ownership structure, it was 
created mainly for the purpose of decentralization rather than to create an internal 
capital market (Fan et al., 2007), so disproportionate ownership structure in SOEs 
means that the controlling power of controlling shareholders has been largely 
decentralized to managers, which makes the agency conflicts between shareholders and 
managers stronger and controlling and minority shareholders less severe. We manually 
collect ownership information such as ultimate owners, controlling shareholders’ cash 
flow and control rights. Disproportionate ownership is quite pervasive: 46% of our IPO 
4 
 
companies are characterized by excess control rights. We find that IPOs with excess 
control rights significantly underperform both the market and other comparable IPOs. 
With three-year market, industry and size adjusted buy-and-hold returns (BHR) and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), IPOs with a control-ownership wedge 
underperform other IPOs by 32% and 16%, respectively. We also find IPOs with excess 
control rights show significant decline in operating performance post-IPO even after 
the pre-IPO earning management is controlled.  
We further provide analysis to understand the channels through which 
disproportionate ownership leads to lower long-run performance. First, we rule out IPO 
mispricing2 as a driver of underperformance for firms with excess control rights. We 
find that first day return is negatively associated with excess control rights. This 
suggests IPOs with disproportionate ownership have lower underpricing, partially 
excluding a possibility that overpricing leads to low long-run stock returns. We 
furthermore link firm performance and ownership structures to related party 
transactions. Recent studies suggest that when corporate wealth can be transferred from 
listed firms to their controlling shareholders, tunneling activities lead to poor 
performance (Peng et al., 2010). We show that the frequency of value-destroying 
related party transactions is increasing in the presence and magnitude of excess control 
rights in IPO firms.    
2 Loughran et al., (1994) document IPO underpricing is a common phenomenon. Loughran and Ritter 
(2002) attribute such underpricing to irrational behavior such as speculation bubbles and market fads. 
5 
 
                                                             
By examining the impact of disproportionate ownership structure on IPO long-run 
performance in Chinese capital market, this paper complements previous literature 
such as Smart and Zutter (2003) and Smart et al. (2008) who examine the value 
implication of control-ownership wedge in the IPO market of the US by documenting a 
strong entrenchment effect of excess control rights in newly listed firms in emerging 
markets. More importantly, it contributes to the literature on IPO long-term 
performance. We show that disproportionate ownership structure can explain IPO 
long-run underperformance. We show channels through which controlling shareholders 
expropriate minority ones by undertaking value-destroying related party transactions.    
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 introduces our data and sample. 
Section 4 analyzes the impact of the divergence between the ultimate owner’s cash 
flow and control rights on long-run performance. Section 5 addresses the effect of the 
ultimately controlling shareholders’ excess control rights on the underpricing of 
non-state controlled IPOs, and section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review 
 The very first investigation into the divergence between cash flow and control 
rights by La Porta et al., (1999), which covers companies from 27 countries, suggests 
that controlling shareholders can gain control rights in excess of their cash flow claims 
through a pyramid structure and the common practice of ownership concentration. In 
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emerging markets, particularly, where concentrated ownership structure is widespread 
and the legal protection of minority shareholders is weak, agency costs are more like to 
originate from a conflict between controlling and minority shareholders. Classens et al., 
(2000), for example, identify a pyramid structure and cross shareholding as the major 
organizational strategy used by firms in nine East Asian economies to separate 
ownership and control. They also provide important evidence that entrenchment effects 
on corporate governance stemming from the divergence between cash flow rights and 
control rights can significantly decrease firm value (Classens et al, 2002), a claim 
supported by several later studies (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Laeven and Levine, 2008; 
Gompers et al., 2010).  
Fan et al. (2011) show that the cost of expropriation is ultimately born by a 
controlling owner who must then devote substantial resources to mitigate the cost, 
while other researchers identify several channels through which large shareholders 
tunnel benefits. Cheung et al.’s (2006) analysis of related party transactions between 
Hong Kong listed companies and their controlling shareholders, for instance, associates 
these transactions with the wealth losses of minority shareholders. Likewise, Peng et al. 
(2010) provide evidence that in Chinese listed firms whose financial condition is sound, 
controlling shareholders use related party transactions to extract private benefits from 
minority shareholders.   
In general, the literature on IPO performance documents two phenomena relevant 
for shareholders: pervasive short-run underpricing of IPOs across markets and time 
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periods and long-run IPO underperformance of the market in the long term, usually 
over three- or five-year periods (Ritter, 1991). Jain and Kini (1994), for example, find 
that new IPOs experience declines in operating performance post issuance. For China, 
Chan et al. (2004) document both underpricing and long-run underperformance, while 
Sun and Tong (2003) show that post-issue performance is negatively related to state 
ownership but positively related to legal-entity ownership. Wang (2005) also 
documents a sharp decline in post-IPO operating performance but argues that neither 
state ownership nor ownership concentration is related to performance. A negative 
relation between a disproportionate ownership structure and the initial return of IPOs is 
identified by Yeh et al. (2008), but their study focuses on the Taiwanese market only.  
All these studies, however, despite being focused on ownership’s effect on IPO 
performance, fail to explore the implication of the first-order agency problems that 
arise from ownership concentration; that is, the conflicts between controlling and 
minority shareholders. In the context of a disproportionate ownership economy, 
controlling shareholders are likely to have perverse incentives because of an excess of 
control rights. If the result is expropriation, it should be evident in IPOs. We therefore 
fill this research void by linking IPO performance to disproportionate ownership 
structure in newly listed firms. 
 The agency problem of disproportionate ownership structure results from conflicts 
of interest. In particular, through a pyramid ownership structure and cross-shareholding, 
controlling shareholders can exert control in excess of their cash flow rights, an 
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imbalance that also makes them less subject to board governance and market discipline. 
Such entrenched controlling shareholders are more likely to pursue private benefits at 
the expense of minority shareholders or outside investors through such activities as 
related party transactions or connected party transactions in which corporate wealth can 
be expropriated through tunneling (Faccio et al., 2001). Fan and Wong (2002) show 
that in East Asian corporations, the earnings-return relation decreases with the level of 
controlling shareholders’ excess control rights. 
In the past three decades, China has undergone a profound institutional reform that 
has transformed its economic system from a central planning economy to a fairly 
decentralized market economy in which almost two-thirds of the nation’s GDP is 
produced by the private sector (China Annuals of Statistics, 2009). Since the opening 
of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in 
December 1990 and July 1991, respectively, China’s stock market has developed 
rapidly. In the early years, the majority of Chinese listed companies were former state 
owned enterprises (SOEs); however, since then the number of IPOs with non-state 
ownership has increased gradually through share issue privatization. Between 2002 and 
2010, for example, the proportion of non-state controlled listed firms among all 
publicly listed companies in China increased from about 18% to more than 70%.  
  
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Sample 
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 Our sample comprises all companies (excluding SOEs) that launched IPOs on the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2002 and 2010. 
We restrict our observations to these years because the reporting of cash flow and 
control rights has only been mandated in China since 2002, and our long-term 
performance analysis requires at least three years of post-issue data, necessitating the 
inclusion of companies that went public prior to December 2010. We also exclude 
financial firms because of their unique accounting standards, and firms with incomplete 
pre- or post-issue financial information. Our final sample consists of 636 firms that 
launched IPOs during the period from 2002 to 2010 (60 firms listed in main board of 
Shanghai Stock exchange, 432 firms listed in SME board and 144 firms listed in GEM 
board of Shenzhen stock exchange)3. All IPOs cases of non-SOEs have been included 
in our sample and no firm has been delisted during our sample period, so our research 
results are not influenced by survivorship bias of our sample. We compile our dataset 
by merging IPO firm characteristics, market performance, financial information, and 
ownership data from the Chinese Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) 
database with related party transactions information from the RESSET database. 
3.2 Variables 
3.2.1 Long-term IPO performance  
3 There are two stock exchanges in China, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Our 
sample covers IPOs listed in both exchanges. The main board here refers to IPOs listed in Shanghai Stock Exchange 
because there are no IPOs listed in main board of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange during our research period. The 
SME and GEM board were established in 2004 and 2009 separately by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which were 
mainly designed to allow small and medium size firms and young high-teach firms to go public. Thus profile of 
firms listed in the main board and SME and GEM board differs. Thus our study includes dummy variables of listed 
boards in our regressions to control potential bias due to the different listed board and exchanges. 
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 We evaluate the post-IPO performance of the non-SOEs in our sample using both 
market- and accounting-based measures. Our market-based performance measures are 
the 12-month, 24-month, and 36-month post-IPO buy-and-hold stock returns (BHR) 
and the cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR), both adjusted by the return of firms 
within the same market, industry, and size4. We calculate our results on the basis of 
monthly stock returns starting from the first month after the IPO date. 
We compute the buy-and-hold market-adjusted stock returns (BHR) as follows: 
1)1(
1
−+=∏
=
t
i
itit rR  
where Rit is the buy-and-hold return of stock i from month 1 to month t, and rit is the 
monthly raw return of the stock, and 
1)1(
1
−+=∏
=
t
i
btbt rR  
where Rbt is the buy-and-hold return of the benchmark portfolio from month 1 to 
month t, and rbt is the monthly raw return of the benchmark portfolio. 
The buy-and-hold market-adjusted return (BHR) is thus 
btitt RRBHR −=  
and the cumulative abnormal stock returns (CAR) is 
btitit rrAR −=  
4 Barber and Lyon (1997) argue that matching firms are the most appropriate benchmark to measure the long-term 
returns and to yield well-specified statistical tests, while Perry and William (1994) claim that firms classified under 
the same industry and with similar size are subject to similar economic and competitive factors and thus have 
comparable operating, investing, and financing opportunity sets. Therefore we calculated the post-IPO market 
performance by using the return of firms within the same market, industry and size as benchmark returns. We 
appreciated the valuable comment made by an anonymous referee regarding this issue.  
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where ARit is the abnormal return of stock i at month t, rit is the monthly raw return of 
the stock, and rbt is the monthly adjusted return of the benchmark portfolio. The 
cumulative abnormal market-adjusted return (CAR) from event month 1 to month t is 
thus 
∑
=
=
t
i
itit ARCAR
1
 
We also evaluate firm performance using accounting-based measures, which, 
however, raises the issue of all Chinese pre-IPO accounting data being subject to 
accounting manipulation to fulfill listing requirements (Aharony et al., 2000). Such 
manipulation can create a downward bias in the accounting performance change 
measures, a bias that we take into account by weighting the results based on stock 
return measures more heavily than those based on accounting return measures. For our 
analysis, we adopt three industry-adjusted5 accounting performance measures: sales 
growth, earnings growth, and the change in return on sales (ROS), calculated as the 
difference between the firm-specific and industry-median value of performance 
measure. We use ROS, calculated as net income divided by sales, rather than ROA or 
ROE because Fan et al. (2007) argue that measures based on equity or assets might 
create a downward bias on Chinese post-IPO firm performance.6 Likewise, due to the 
fact that firms change significantly after IPO and the pre-IPO accounting performance 
and subject to manipulation, we use the average changes of the accounting 
5 We employ the six-industry classifications borrowed from Firth et al. (2006): finance, industrial, commercial, 
public utility, property, and conglomerate (all other industries). 
6 See Fan et al. (2007) for more details. 
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performance measures (sales growth, earnings growth and ROS) in the 3-year post-IPO 
period rather than the accounting performance changes before and after the IPO as 
proxy of post-IPO accounting performance change. It should be noted, however, that 
we have omitted the accounting numbers in the IPO year because these data tend to be 
heavily manipulated (Fan et al., 2007), and that the pre-IPO earning management is 
controlled in our regressions by including the pre-IPO earning management as a control 
variable.  
3.2.2 Underpricing of IPO issues 
We calculate the underpricing of an IPO issue as the return on the first day of 
trading (relative to the offering price): 
0
01
0
i
ii
i P
PP
RET
−
=  
where Reti0 is the initial return (underpricing) of stock i, Pi0 is the closing price of stock 
i on the first trading day, and Pil is the offering price of stock i. 
The market return on the first trading day of the new stock is  
0
01
0
im
imim
i P
PP
RET
−
=  
where Retim is the market return on the first trading day of the new stock i, Pi,m0 is the 
closing price of the appropriate Shanghai or Shenzhen composite index that 
corresponds to the offering day of the new stock i, and Pi,ml is the closing price of the 
appropriate Shanghai or Shenzhen composite index on the first trading day of the new 
stock i . 
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We adjust the return for the market effect as follows: 
imii RETRETADJRET −= 00  
where AdjReti0 is the initial return (underpricing) of stock i. 
3.2.3 Disproportionate ownership structure, cash flow rights, and control rights 
To examine the effects of a disproportionate ownership structure, we first identify 
the ultimate controlling shareholders by tracing the chain of ownership. Consistent with 
previous studies (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002), we define control rights 
as the weakest link in the chain and cash flow rights as the product of ownership stakes 
along the chain. To illustrate, if an ultimately controlling shareholder owns 70% of the 
stock of publicly traded firm A, which in turn has 35% of the stock of firm B, then the 
ultimately controlling shareholder controls 35% of firm B, the weakest link in the 
control rights chain, and has cash flow rights of 24.5%, the product of the two 
ownership stakes along the chain. Because of a pyramid structure, cross-shareholding, 
and dual-class stocks, the largest shareholders’ control rights are always in excess of its 
cash flow rights (La Porta et al., 1999), and because controlling shareholders’ control 
rights exceed their cash flow rights, they always have the incentive and opportunity to 
expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders (La Porta et al., 1999).  
3.2.4 Other control variables 
   Following previous studies, several control variables are also included in our study, 
detailed definition of all our variables used in this paper are reported in Appendix A. 
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3.3 Sample distribution and description 
Table 1 provides the distribution and description of our sample. As Panel A clearly 
shows, the IPO firms are unevenly distributed across the sample period, which largely 
reflects the overall IPO market condition in China. From 2002 to 2006, the Chinese 
stock market experienced a serious bear market in which the Shanghai Stock Index 
dropped from 2,200 in mid-2001 to 1,050 in mid-2005, and only a few firms (e.g., 
eight in 2005) went public. Panel A also reveals that an average 45.60% of the sample 
firms have a disproportionate ownership structure, with the highest percentage 
occurring in 2005, when all the IPO firms had such a structure, and the lowest (39.80%) 
occurring in 2010. In the remaining years, the percentages fluctuate from 40.91% to 
63.27%. The presence of a disproportionate ownership structure also varies across 
industries: the highest percentage occurs in the property and real estate and commercial 
sectors (70.00% and 68.75%), followed by the industrial sector (45.68%), the public 
utilities sector (44.19%), and the conglomerate sector (38.27%). In terms of listed 
board, 48.33% of IPO firms listed in main board have disproportionate ownership 
structure, while the number is 50% and 31.25% in SME and GEM board. 
Panel B reports firm characteristics at the time of the IPO. With a mean initial 
return of 79.30%, the average levels of underpricing are lower than those reported in 
earlier research (Mok and Hui, 1998; Su and Fleisher, 1999; Chan et al., 2004). 
Nonetheless, the underpricing of IPOs in China is still much higher than that in 
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developed markets (Loughran et al., 1994):7 the mean (median) number of shares 
issued (in millions) is 66.46 (51.10) and the mean (median) issue price of the IPOs is 
22.15 (18.80) RMB. Panel B also shows average cash flow rights of 36.64% as 
compared to excess control rights of 5.94%, which indicates a clear divergence 
between the largest shareholders’ control rights and their cash flow rights in non-state 
controlled IPOs firms. 
Panel C reports the mean and median values of the stock-based and 
accounting-based performance measures for the sample. It clearly shows that the 
average BHR and CAR of newly listed non-state controlled firms in China fall 
significantly in the three years subsequent to their IPOs in terms of both mean and 
median. As regards the accounting-based measures, the mean (median) change in the 
three-year average ROS of the sample is a negative -13.02% (-7.61%), reflecting a 
decline in Chinese IPO firms’ accounting performance that is consistent with the data 
reported by Aharony et al. (2000) and Sun and Tong (2003). Although the average 
post-IPO sales growth is positive (20.88%), the earnings growth lags far behind the 
sales growth (-28.90%), suggesting that the accounting performance of Chinese firms 
decrease in the post-IPO period.   
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
7  Please visit Jay Ritter’s website at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/interntl.htm for the most recently updated 
information. 
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4. Disproportionate ownership structure and long-term firm performance  
In this section, we investigate how the disproportionate ownership structure of 
non-state controlled IPO firms affects their long-term market-based performance and 
accounting-based performance. 
4.1. Univariate tests 
 Figure 1 plots the mean BHRs and CARs, respectively, of non-state controlled 
IPOs firms in China sorted by whether or not the controlling shareholders have excess 
control rights. In Panel A, the mean BHR of the group of IPOs firms with excess 
control (in solid lines) remain negative over the three years, while the mean BHR of the 
group of IPOs firms without excess control (in dotted lines) is much more than that of 
firms with excess control rights although it also exhibits negative. And the difference 
between the two groups of firms is larger as time passes. Likewise, very similar results 
are found in Panel B.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 reports the mean and median values of the market-based and 
accounting-based performance measures for two subsamples sorted by whether or not 
the firms are characterized by excess control rights. In each of the three post-IPO years, 
the mean and median BHRs and CARs of firms with excess shareholder control rights 
are statistically significantly lower than those for firms without. This finding indicates 
that the post-IPO market can indeed distinguish between the two groups of firms. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the difference in average BHRs and CARs between the 
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two groups grows larger over time, suggesting that over the years, the market gradually 
perceives the negative effects of entrenchment. Our between-group comparison of 
accounting-based performance measures further shows that firms with excess control 
rights experience a more substantial drop in average ROS and slower sales and 
earnings growth than do their counterparts without excess control rights. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
4.2 Regressions 
4.2.1 Disproportionate ownership structure and post-IPO market performance 
To examine the effects of disproportionate ownership structure on post-IPO 
performance, we perform regression analyses using generalized least squares to control 
for sample heterogeneity. Tables 3 and 4 summarize our regression results using the 12-, 
24-, and 36-month BHRs and CARs as dependent variables. As the BHRs may not be 
normally distributed, to alleviate the potential influence of non-normal distribution of 
the long-term performance of IPOs, we transform the equal weighted matching 
firm-adjusted three-year BHR to the natural logarithm of 1000% plus each BHR. The 
regressions also include the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights 
(CASHFLOW), the degree of excess control (EXCESS), and a dummy (EXDUMMY) 
equal to one if the wedge between the ultimately controlling shareholders’ control 
rights and cash flow rights is larger than zero. The control variables are the log of total 
assets (SIZE), debt-to-asset ratio (LEVERAGE), issuing P/E ratio (P/E) to control the 
influence from issuing price, a dummy variable SELLING (a dummy equals to 1 if 
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there are block trading activities within a specific year and 0 otherwise) to control the 
potential influence from block holder’s selling activities on stock return. Finally, year 
and industry dummies to control for the effect of year and industry factors, dummies 
for listed board are included to control for the different profiles of IPOs listed on 
different boards.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Consistent with the univariate results reported in table 2, the multivariate 
regression results show that firms with a disproportionate ownership structure 
experience a more statistically significant stock performance decline after the IPO (as 
shown in table 3, the regression coefficients of excess control rights (EXCESS) are all 
statistically significantly negative). The results indicate that firms with a 
disproportionate ownership structure underperform those without in term of BHR, 
which is consistent with our univariate test results. Likewise, as shown in table 4, firms 
with a disproportionate ownership structure significantly underperform those without 
in CARs in the post-IPO period of 12, 24 and 36 months. 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
4.2.2 Disproportionate ownership structure and post-IPO accounting performance 
 
Table 5 reports the results of our regressions analyzing the effects of a 
disproportionate ownership structure on changes in post-IPO accounting performance, 
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measure by the average change in ROS, sales growth, and earnings growth in the 
3-years post-IPO period. Panel A and B reports the results using excess control rights 
and excess dummy as explanatory variables separately. Main control variables are the 
degree of excess control (EXCESS), and a dummy (EXDUMMY) equal to one if the 
wedge between the ultimately controlling shareholders’ control rights and cash flow 
rights is larger than zero. In addition to the control variables used in Table 3 and 4, we 
include one more variable (EM8), which is the degree of earning management in the 3 
year pre-IPO period, the results are reported separately in columns (2), (4) and (6). This 
is because pre-IPO firms in China tend to manipulate their earnings in the pre-IPO 
period (Chen et al., 2013), which may also result in a decrease in post-IPO accounting 
performance. In other word, if we observe a worse post-IPO accounting performance in 
firms with excess control rights, it may be caused by those firms have more pre-IPO 
earnings management. By controlling the pre-IPO earning management in our 
regression models, we are able to achieve results that are free from potential effect 
from pre-IPO earnings management. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 The regression results in Table 5 indicate that firms with a disproportionate 
ownership structure experience deteriorating accounting performance subsequent to 
their IPOs regardless of whether performance is measured by the change in ROS, sales 
8 Earnings management is defined by discretionary accruals (DAs) using the modified Jones models developed by 
Jones (1991). 
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growth, or earnings growth, even after the pre-IPO earnings management has been 
controlled. Consistent with the univariate test results, our results show that every one 
percentage increase in excess control rights results in a 2.66% (2.58%) decline for the 
change in ROS, a 0.45% (0.41%) slower sales growth, and 4.38% (5.67%) slower 
earnings growth.  
According to Aharony et al. (2000), in managing their earnings, Chinese firms 
typically manipulate accruals and profits from non-core operations. Therefore, to check 
the robustness of our results and to bring our accounting-based measures more in line 
with those of previous studies, we also use operating earnings/assets, operating 
earnings growth, and net operating income growth as accounting-based performance 
measures to test the relation between a disproportionate ownership structure and 
performance changes. As table 6 indicates, even using these alternative post-IPO 
accounting performance changes, the level of excess control rights remains negatively 
correlated with firms’ accounting performance subsequent to the IPO. More specifically, 
firms whose ultimately controlling shareholders have more excess control rights 
experience a greater drop in operating earnings/assets and slower operating earnings 
growth and net income growth. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Taken together, the regression results in tables 3, 4, 5, and 6 suggest that non-state 
controlled firms in China that have issued IPOs generally show poorer stock returns 
and accounting performance when the ultimately controlling shareholders can exert 
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control through a pyramidal structure or cross-shareholding using control rights that are 
in excess of cash flow rights. 
4.3 Disproportionate ownership structure and related party transactions 
On the assumption that controlling shareholders can expropriate minority 
shareholders by tunneling the wealth of listed firms, we now explore whether a firm 
with disproportionate ownership structure is more likely to conduct tunneling activities. 
Using related party transactions as proxies, we measure the effect of the wedges 
between control rights and cash flow rights on the probability of a firm undertaking 
tunneling transactions using the likelihood of a firm undertaking a value-destroying 
related party transaction as the dependent variable. Because there is no accurate 
measure of exactly how much benefit is transferred through these transactions, as in 
prior studies (Cheung et al., 2006, 2009), we use the market reaction to related party 
transaction announcements as a proxy. A negative market reaction indicates tunneling, 
which reduces firm value and goes against the interests of minority shareholders. We 
define value-destroying related party transactions as any connected transaction 
associated with negative cumulative abnormal market-adjusted stock returns (CARs) 
over trading day windows [0,+1], [-1,+1], [-2,+2], [-2,+5] relative to the announcement 
day (day 0). We report the estimates of our logistic models in table 7. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
As the table clearly shows, firms with a disproportionate ownership structure are 
more likely to engage in value-destroying related party transactions, and the likelihood 
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of a firm’s engaging in such transactions increases with the divergence between control 
rights and cash flow rights. Moreover, consistent with Cheung et al.’s (2006) findings, 
the cash flow rights of controlling shareholders and firm size are negatively related to 
value-destroying related party transactions. Overall, the evidence in table 7 indicates a 
positive relation between disproportionate ownership and the likelihood of controlling 
shareholders expropriating minority shareholders. This relation is stronger for IPO 
firms with a wider wedge between controlling shareholders’ control rights and cash 
flow rights. This evidence further indicates that, in long-term, the underperformance of 
IPOs with excess control rights relative to IPOs without excess control rights is partly 
driven by their higher likelihood of undertaking value-destroying related party 
transactions. 
4.4 Robustness results 
For robustness of our results, we also conduct the following tests: (1) we use the 
ratio of control rights and cash flow rights as new measure of excess control rights, and 
we find the positive relationship still hold between new measure of excess control 
rights and post-IPO performance; (2) we conduct separate regressions using different 
subsample of firms listed in main board, SME board and GEM board, and similar 
results are found indicating that the worse post-IPO performance in firms with excess 
control rights is not driven by the different risk profile of firms listed in different 
boards. The results of these robustness tests are not reported to save space. 
5. Disproportionate ownership structure and initial IPO returns  
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This section examines how the disproportionate ownership structure of non-state 
controlled IPO firms affects initial IPO returns (underpricing). Table 8 reports the mean 
and median market-adjusted initial stock returns for our sample, sorted by controlling 
shareholders’ excess control rights and year. As the table shows, in most years, firms 
with a disproportionate ownership structure show smaller initial returns than firms 
without. The difference in mean of market-adjusted initial return of firms with and 
without disproportionate ownership structure is 9.16% (71.47% versus 80.63%, which 
is significant at the 10% level. These results support our hypothesis that the largest 
controlling shareholders’ excess control rights have a negative impact on the initial 
returns of non-state controlled IPO firms.  
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
To distinguish the effect of a disproportionate ownership structure on the initial 
returns of non-state controlled firms, we also perform a regression analysis that 
controls for additional firm, industry, year, and institutional factors in China’s IPO 
markets. The dependent variable in this model is the IPO’s initial stock return, 
including both the unadjusted initial return (INITIAL RETURN) and the market-adjusted 
return (ADJ. INITIAL RETURN). Our key independent variables are the degree of the 
excess control rights (EXCESS) and a dummy (EXDUMMY) for the largest 
shareholders having excess control rights. The results are reported in panel A (initial 
return as dependent variable) and B (adjusted initial return as dependent variable) of 
Table 9. As in panel A of Table 9, when we include the key independents and only 
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control for year and industry factors, the estimated coefficients are significantly 
negative at the 5% level for the degree of excess control rights (Ex_wedge) and at the 
1% level for the presence of largest shareholders’ excess control rights (Ex_dummy). 
We then run further regressions that include additional control variables suggested 
by prior research on IPO underpricing. Chowdhry and Sherman (1996), for example, 
suggest that underpricing can be affected by the time gap between the offering and the 
listing. That is, because the information known by issuers, underwriters, and investors 
is asymmetrical (Baron, 1982; Rock, 1986), the longer the time lags between the 
offering and the listing, the higher the risk to investors and thus the greater the 
probability of underpricing. In fact, both Chan et al. (2004) and Su (2004) provide 
empirical evidence that IPO underpricing in China is positively related to the 
offering-to-listing time lag. To capture the effects of this information asymmetry, we 
include the natural logarithm of the number of days between the offering and listing 
dates (DAYLAG), together with other variables commonly used in related studies of 
Chinese IPOs (Su and Fleisher, 1999; Chan et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2004), including 
the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights (CASHFLOW); the age of the 
firms(LNAGE), represented by the natural logarithm of one plus the age in years of the 
company from the date on which it was first listed (with any part of a year treated as a 
whole year); the issue size (PROCEEDS), represented by the natural logarithm of the 
gross proceeds; the issuing P/E ratio and year, industry and listed dummies.  
[INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE] 
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The results of these multiple regressions, shown in table 9, indicate that the time 
lag between the IPO date and the first trading date is insignificant in explaining IPO 
underpricing. Although this result contrasts with those of earlier studies (Mok and Hui, 
1998; Su and Fleisher,1999; Chen et al.,2004), it is consistent with more recent 
findings that the time lag in the Chinese IPO market has been dramatically shortened, 
thereby removing previously unknown factors caused by the long time lag (Yu and Tse, 
2006). The coefficients for the degree of excess control rights (EXCESS) reported in 
panel A and the dummy variable (EXDUMMY) reported in panel B remains negative 
and they are statistically significant. The marginally lower initial return, or smaller 
underpricing, associated with a disproportionate ownership structure is consistent with 
our second hypothesis that, in non-state controlled IPO firms, the excess control rights 
enjoyed by ultimately controlling shareholders become entrenched in a 
disproportionate ownership structure, thereby giving largest controlling shareholders 
less incentive to underprice new issues. These results, which support our second 
hypothesis, are also consistent with Yeh et al.’s (2008) findings for Taiwan. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Public investors invest in IPOs at capital markets because they believe in the 
issuing firms’ future prospects, financial performance, and corporate governance. In 
China, the world’s largest emerging economy, although the IPO market is actively 
attracting critical financing from retail investors, the long-run IPO performance is 
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proving dismal. Many newly listed firms are essentially controlled by private owners 
through a complex pyramid ownership structure, which gives their controlling 
shareholders greater control rights in excess of their cash flow rights. Under this 
disproportionate ownership structure, controlling shareholders are incentivized to 
expropriate minority shareholders. IPOs with the disproportional ownership structure 
should be deemed as bad investment in the long run for public investors. 
Utilizing a hand-collected data on ownership for publicly listed non-SOEs, we 
show that IPO firms characterized by excess control rights significantly underperform 
other IPOs in the long-run stock and operating performance. Our findings thus suggest 
that the conflict between large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders 
remains the primary agency problem because of the significant entrenchment effect 
generated by disproportional ownership structures. Furthermore we show that IPO 
firms with excess control show significantly lower first day return but are associated 
with higher frequency of value-destroying related party transactions, suggesting that 
the latter reason can explain IPO-run poor performance. 
This research has important implications for both investors and regulators. First, 
small public investors interested in IPOs must understand the ownership structure of 
the newly listed firm and rationally discount the price of such firms commensurate with 
the adverse incentives of controlling shareholders. Disproportionate ownership 
structures have to be considered as an important corporate governance issue. 
Regulators, for their part, must recognize that the current investor protection systems 
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need to address the challenge of protecting minority investors in corporations 
characterized by a complex and disproportionate ownership structure.  
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Table 1: Sample and Variables Summary statistics  
This table presents summary information on the sample of non-state controlled IPO firms in China. 
Panel A reports the sample by year of IPO, industry sector and the listed board. Panel B lists the 
IPO firm characteristics, including initial return, market-adjusted initial return, firm age, issue size 
(i.e., the value of shares issued in millions), the number of days between the offering and listing 
dates, the listing date issue (ordering) price, the ultimately controlling shareholders’ cash flow rights, 
and the level of excess control rights (i.e., the difference between the ultimately controlling 
shareholders’ cash flow rights and control rights). Panel C reports statistics for the two 
market-based performance measures of non-state controlled Chinese firms that went public during 
2002–2010 and for the accounting-based performance measures of non-state controlled Chinese 
firms that went public during 2002–2010. The market-based performance measures are the 
buy-and-hold adjusted returns (BHRs) and the cumulative market-adjusted stock returns (CARs) 
accumulated for 12, 24, and 36 months starting from one month after the IPO month, both market 
based performances are adjusted by market, industry, and size. The accounting return measures are 
the average industry adjusted change in return on sales (ΔAROS), sales growth (ΔAGSALES), and 
earnings growth (ΔAGEARNS) in the three-year post-IPO period.  
Panel A: Distribution of firms by IPO year, industry and listed board 
 Number of IPOs  
IPO Year 
Firms with 
excess control 
Firm without 
excess control Total 
Firms with excess control in 
total sample by year (%) 
2002 6 6 12 50.00 
2003 9 13 22 40.91 
2004 31 18 49 63.27 
2005 8 0 8 100.00 
2006 20 14 34 58.82 
2007 39 36 75 52.00 
2008 25 33 58 43.10 
2009 33 46 79 41.77 
2010 119 180 299 39.80 
     
Public utilities 19 24 43 44.19 
Real estate 7 3 10 70.00 
Conglomerate 31 50 81 38.27 
Industrial 222 264 486 45.68 
Commercial 11 5 16 68.75 
     
Main board 29 31 60 48.33 
SME 216 216 432 50.00 
GEM 45 99 144 31.25 
     
Total 290 346 636 45.60 
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Panel B: Characteristics of IPO firms 
Panel B: Characteristics of IPO firms  
 Mean Median Min Max Std. dev. 
Initial return (%) 79.30 52.41 -9.91 538.12 0.82 
Market-adjusted initial return (%) 78.84 51.67 -11.22 525.75 0.81 
Firm Age  6.41 6.00 2.00 21.00 3.86 
Issue size (in millions)  66.46 51.10 10.94 593.48 56.36 
Days elapsed between offering and 
listing  
13.81 13.00 7.00 50.00 4.54 
Issue price  22.15 18.80 2.60 148.00 15.54 
Cash flow rights 36.64 35.73 0.00 85.39 16.04 
Excess control rights (%) 5.94 0.00 0.00 53.42 8.76 
Excess dummy 0.46 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 
 
Panel C: Market-based performance and accounting-based performance 
Panel C: Market-based performance and accounting-based performance  
 Mean Median Min. Max. Std. dev. Obs. 
BHR 12 (%) -14.97 -12.52 -239.53 293.20 49.64 636 
BHR 24 (%) -13.42 -17.84 -333.67 434.54 60.69 636 
BHR 36 (%) -25.42 -30.63 -723.07 2148.31 146.22 636 
 
CAR 12 (%) -9.69 -11.01 -123.11 131.92 36.45 636 
CAR 24 (%) -11.04 -13.36 -220.50 146.75 46.88 636 
CAR 36 (%) -15.13 -18.42 -235.50 212.94 58.50 636 
 
ΔAROS (%) -13.02 -7.61 -1973.55 395.24 98.35 636 
ΔAGSALES(%) 20.88 16.81 -58.58 394.17 29.07 636 
ΔAGEARNS (%) -28.90 -9.40 -2482.897 2544.564 240.92 636 
Data sources: China Security Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) and authors' own 
calculations. 
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Table 2: Mean and median statistics of post-IPO performance measures 
 
This table presents the mean and median values for market-based and accounting-based 
performance measures of non-state controlled Chinese firms that went public during 2002–2010. 
The firms are sorted by whether or not the ultimately controlling shareholders have control rights in 
excess of their cash flow rights. The market-based performance measures are the buy-and-hold 
returns (BHRs) and the cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) accumulated for 12, 24, and 36 
months starting from one month after the IPO month, both performances are adjusted by market, 
industry, and size. We calculate the CARs measure based on monthly market-adjust stock returns, 
and compute the market returns as the weighted returns for all common stocks traded on the 
Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchanges. The accounting return measures are the average industry 
adjusted change in return on sales (ΔAROS), sales growth (ΔAGSALES), and earnings growth 
(ΔAGEARNS) in the three-year post-IPO period.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 Obs.  
With 
Excess 
control 
Without 
Excess  
control 
Different 
 
p-value of 
mean/median  
difference 
BHR 12 (%) 636 Mean -19.86 -10.88 -8.98** 0.02 
Median -16.58 -9.49 -7.09*** 0.00 
BHR 24 (%) 636 Mean -21.93 -6.29 -15.64*** 0.00 
Median -21.89 -14.10 -7.79*** 0.00 
BHR 36 (%) 636 Mean -42.65 -10.97 -31.68*** 0.00 
Median -43.49 -20.70 -22.79*** 0.00 
CAR 12 (%) 636 Mean -13.04 -6.88 -6.16** 0.03 
Median -14.68 -7.27 -7.41** 0.01 
CAR 24 (%) 636 Mean -17.03 -6.03 -11.00*** 0.00 
Median -17.62 -8.81 -8.81** 0.00 
CAR 36 (%) 636 Mean -23.83 -7.83 -16.00*** 0.00 
Median -26.15 -10.15 -16.00*** 0.00 
ΔAROS (%)) 636 Mean -22.52 -5.05 -17.47** 0.03 
Median -10.60 -2.24 -8.36** 0.00 
ΔAGSALES(%) 636 Mean 18.20 23.13 -4.93** 0.03 
Median 13.21 18.47 -5.26*** 0.00 
ΔAGEARNS (%) 636 Mean -45.09 -15.32 -29.77 -0.12 
Median -37.14 8.99 -46.13*** 0.00 
Data sources: China Security Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) and authors' own 
calculations. 
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Table 3: GLS regression results for the effects of disproportionate ownership 
structure on the post-IPO stock performance (BHRs)  
 
In this table, the dependent variable is market-based performance, measured as BHRs for 12, 24, 
and 36 months, starting from one month after the IPO month. The BHR measures are calculated 
based on monthly market, industry, and size-adjusted stock returns. As the BHRs may not be 
normally distributed, to alleviate the potential influence of non-normal distribution of the long-term 
performance of IPOs, we transform the equal weighted matching firm-adjusted three-year BHR to 
the natural logarithm of 1000% plus each BHR. Definitions of variables are detailed in Appendix A. 
p-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 BHR12 BHR24 BHR36 
EXCESS -0.30***  -0.20*  -0.53***  
 (0.01)  (0.06)  (0.00)  
EXDUMMY  -0.02  -0.02*  -0.03** 
  (0.22)  (0.07)  (0.03) 
CASHFLOW 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.10* -0.03 0.06 
 (0.42) (0.11) (0.25) (0.09) (0.69) (0.37) 
SIZE 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.16) (0.23) (0.69) (0.69) (0.84) (0.59) 
LEVERAGE -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.27) (0.31) (0.39) (0.41) (0.48) (0.59) 
P/E 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.95) (0.95) (0.80) (0.87) (0.79) (0.62) 
SELLING -0.02 -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.02 0.02 
 (0.26) (0.29) (0.77) (0.77) (0.25) (0.21) 
Const 0.86*** 0.88*** 1.32*** 1.31*** 2.23*** 2.27*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Board Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 636 636 636 636 636 636 
adj. R2 0.466 0.461 0.434 0.433 0.274 0.255 
Data sources: China Security Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) and authors' 
own calculations. 
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Table 4: GLS regression results of the effects of a disproportionate ownership 
structure on the post-IPO stock performance (CARs)   
 
In this table, the dependent variable is market-based performance, measured as CARs accumulated 
for 12, 24, and 36 months, starting from one month after the IPO month. The CAR measures are 
calculated based on monthly market, industry, and size-adjusted stock returns. As the CARs may 
not be normally distributed, to alleviate the potential influence of non-normal distribution of the 
long-term performance of IPOs, we transform the equal weighted matching firm-adjusted three-year 
CAR to the natural logarithm of 1000% plus each CAR. Definitions of variables are detailed in 
Appendix A. P-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 CAR12 CAR24 CAR36 
EXCESS -0.22***  -0.30***  -0.63***  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.00)  
EXDUMMY  -0.02*  -0.02*  -0.03* 
  (0.06)  (0.08)  (0.05) 
CASHFLOW 0.05 0.08* 0.07 0.12* -0.04 0.07 
 (0.33) (0.08) (0.28) (0.06) (0.69) (0.44) 
SIZE 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 (0.47) (0.54) (0.41) (0.34) (0.53) (0.35) 
LEVERAGE -0.03 -0.03 -0.00 0.00 -0.04 -0.03 
 (0.41) (0.45) (0.94) (0.99) (0.58) (0.68) 
P/E 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.65) (0.75) (0.61) (0.71) (0.71) (0.88) 
SELLING -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 
 (0.61) (0.63) (0.99) (0.96) (0.41) (0.36) 
Const 1.01*** 1.02*** 1.29*** 1.30*** 1.37*** 1.41*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Board Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 636 636 636 636 636 636 
adj. R2 0.235 0.231 0.208 0.202 0.170 0.152 
Data sources: China Security Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) and authors' 
own calculations. 
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Table 5: GLS regression results for the effects of a disproportionate ownership 
structure on the post-IPO accounting-based performance  
 
In this table, the dependent variable is, alternately, the average industry adjusted change in 
return on sales (ΔAROS), sales growth (ΔAGSALES), and earnings growth (ΔAGEARNS) in 
the three-year post-IPO period. ΔSIZE, ΔLEVERAGE, and ΔP/E are the average industry 
adjusted change in firm size, leverage ratio and P/E ratio in the three-year post-IPO period. 
Excess control rights and cash flow rights are not change values because ownership structure 
are less likely to be changed during the 3 year lockup period. The number of observations in 
columns (2), (4) and (6) are smaller when we include pre-IPO earning management in our 
models because some firms do not have enough pre-IPO information to calculate the pre-IPO 
earning management. Pre-IPO earning management (EM) is also not in change values because 
they are pre-IPO values. Definitions of all other variables are detailed in Appendix A. P-values 
are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A. Excess control rights as measure of disproportionate ownership structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔAROS ΔAGSALES ΔAGEARNS 
EXCESS -2.66*** -2.58** -0.45*** -0.41** -4.38** -5.67*** 
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) 
CASHFLOW -0.14 -0.32** -0.02 0.03 0.82 -1.00 
 (0.75) (0.04) (0.84) (0.74) (0.43) (0.34) 
ΔSIZE 0.47*** 0.09 0.73*** 0.62*** 1.75*** 1.16*** 
 (0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ΔLEVERAGE -0.21** -0.05* 0.07*** 0.08*** -0.53** -0.51*** 
 (0.03) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
ΔP/E -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.01** -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.94) (0.72) (0.03) (0.01) (0.24) (0.26) 
EM  -0.38  -1.59  -0.89 
  (0.83)  (0.18)  (0.94) 
Const 49.44 -6.39 21.95*** 13.98 -311.25*** -174.75* 
 (0.14) (0.64) (0.00) (0.13) (0.00) (0.06) 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Board Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 636 533 636 533 636 533 
adj. R2 0.046 0.019 0.414 0.438 0.078 0.051 
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Panel B. Excess dummy as measure of disproportionate ownership structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔAROS ΔAGSALES ΔAGEARNS 
EXDUMMY -15.99** -6.20** -4.49** -2.90* -34.03* -38.76** 
 (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.09) (0.08) (0.02) 
CASHFLOW 0.28 -0.25* 0.04 0.10 1.48 -0.12 
 (0.50) (0.09) (0.66) (0.33) (0.14) (0.90) 
ΔSIZE 0.49*** 0.09* 0.74*** 0.62*** 1.78*** 1.21*** 
 (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
ΔLEVERAGE -0.23** -0.06** 0.07*** 0.08*** -0.55** -0.53*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) 
ΔP/E -0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.01** -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.97) (0.70) (0.03) (0.01) (0.25) (0.26) 
EM  -0.64  -1.72  -2.57 
  (0.72)  (0.15)  (0.83) 
Const 20.52 -14.03 18.14** 21.71** -354.38*** -227.28** 
 (0.53) (0.29) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Board Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 636 533 636 533 636 533 
adj. R2 0.046 0.019 0.414 0.438 0.078 0.051 
Data sources: China Security Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) and authors' own 
calculations.
39 
 
Table 6: GLS regression results for the effects of disproportionate ownership 
structure on the post-IPO accounting-based performance   
 
In this table, the dependent variable is, alternately, the change in operating earnings/assets 
(ΔAOE/A), the operating earnings growth (ΔGAOE), and the net income growth (ΔGANOI) in 
the 3-year post-IPO period. ΔSIZE, ΔLEVERAGE, and ΔP/E are the average industry adjusted 
change in firm size, leverage ratio and P/E ratio in the three-year post-IPO period. Excess 
control rights and cash flow rights are not change values because ownership structure are less 
likely to be changed during the 3 year lockup period. The number of observations in columns 
(2), (4) and (6) are smaller when we include pre-IPO earning management in our models 
because some firms do not have enough pre-IPO information to calculate the pre-IPO earning 
management. Definitions of all other variables are detailed in Appendix A. P-values are in 
parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
Panel A. Excess control rights as measure of disproportionate ownership structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔAOE/A ΔGAOE ΔGANOI 
EXCESS -27.04*** -6.08** -11.01** -15.35*** -10.31*** -9.98*** 
 (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CASHFLOW 1.05 -0.69 0.79 -0.58 1.38 -0.73 
 (0.80) (0.67) (0.76) (0.85) (0.44) (0.59) 
ΔSIZE 4.39*** 0.77 1.70 1.51 2.32*** 1.40*** 
 (0.01) (0.18) (0.10) (0.15) (0.00) (0.00) 
ΔLEVERAGE -2.42*** -0.54* 0.59 0.70 -0.87** -0.61** 
 (0.01) (0.07) (0.31) (0.20) (0.03) (0.01) 
ΔP/E 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.98) (0.38) (0.45) (0.39) (0.79) (0.43) 
EM  -4.64  18.52  -3.16 
  (0.80)  (0.58)  (0.84) 
Const -78.15 -88.32 -689.12*** -281.59 95.87 -90.31 
 (0.81) (0.54) (0.00) (0.29) (0.48) (0.45) 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Board Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 636 533 636 533 636 533 
adj. R2 0.056 0.004 0.035 0.018 0.033 0.049 
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 Panel B. Excess dummy as measure of disproportionate ownership structure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ΔAOE/A ΔAOE ΔANOI 
EXDUMMY -139.31* -46.96* -86.70* -101.26** -55.25* -47.91** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03) 
CASHFLOW 5.44 0.22 2.46 1.82 3.04* 0.95 
 (0.18) (0.89) (0.33) (0.52) (0.07) (0.46) 
ΔSIZE 4.61*** 0.82 1.79* 1.63 2.40*** 1.47*** 
 (0.01) (0.15) (0.09) (0.12) (0.00) (0.00) 
ΔLEVERAGE -2.51*** -0.58* 0.53 0.63 -0.90** -0.64** 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.36) (0.25) (0.02) (0.01) 
ΔP/E 0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 
 (0.94) (0.38) (0.46) (0.38) (0.83) (0.43) 
SELLING -28.53 -14.95 -13.34 -20.03 -13.13 -9.98 
 (0.74) (0.58) (0.80) (0.68) (0.71) (0.66) 
EM  -6.66  14.13  -5.30 
  (0.72)  (0.68)  (0.73) 
Const -385.51 -173.90 -796.95*** -423.26* -20.02 -229.02* 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.00) (0.10) (0.88) (0.05) 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Board Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 636 533 636 533 636 533 
adj. R2 0.037 0.001 0.030 0.010 0.018 0.026 
Data sources: China Security Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) and authors' own 
calculations. 
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Table 7: Logistical regressions on the likelihood of undertaking value-destroying 
related party transactions 
 
In this table, the dependent variable is a value-destroying connected transactions dummy that 
equals one if the firm has undertaken a connected transaction associated with negative 
cumulative abnormal market-adjusted stock returns (CARs) over trading day window [0,+1], 
[-1,+1], [-2,+2], [-2,+5] relative to the announcement day (day 0). The sample includes a total 
of 9,847 related party transactions over 36 months for 636 IPO firms, starting from one month 
after the IPO month. We calculate the CARs based on daily market-adjusted stock returns and 
compute the market returns as the value weighted returns for all common stocks traded on the 
Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchanges. Definitions of variables are detailed in Appendix A. 
P-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
=1 if CAR[0,+1] <0 =1 if CAR[-1,+1] <0 =1 if CAR[-2,+2] <0 =1 if CAR[-2,+5] <0 
EXCESS 0.05***  0.03***  0.03***  0.04***  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
EXDUMMY  1.04***  0.95***  0.67***  0.83*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00) 
CASHFLOW -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.000) (0.00) 
SIZE -0.68*** -0.52*** -0.47*** -0.42*** -1.08*** -1.02*** -0.97*** -0.86*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LEVERAGE -0.00 -0.00* -0.00*** -0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00 0.00 
 (0.23) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.35) (0.47) 
Const 12.06*** 7.32*** 11.61*** 8.27*** 24.46*** 17.49*** 26.96*** 18.63*** 
Industry Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Board Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
N 9847 9847 9847 9847 9847 9847 9847 9847 
pseudo R2 0.116 0.132 0.100 0.115 0.157 0.161 0.168 0.176 
Data sources: China Security Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) and authors' own 
calculations. 
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Table 8: Mean and median statistics of initial returns 
 
This table reports mean and median statistics of the initial (first day) stock returns of non-state 
controlled IPOs grouped by whether or not the Chinese IPO firm is subject to excess 
shareholder control during 2002–2010. The initial return of an IPO is measured as the 
difference between the closing stock price on the first trading day and the offering price, and 
then divided by the offering price adjusted by market return. Excess control > 0 and Excess 
control = 0 refer to firms with and without excess control rights. Note there is no IPO firm 
without excess control rights in the year 2005. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 
5%, 1% levels, respectively. 
   Market-adjusted initial returns (%)  
 Obs.  
Excess  
control > 0 
Excess  
control = 0 Difference 
p-value of 
mean/median  
difference 
2002 12 
Mean 113.85  139.28  -25.44  0.32 
Median 98.69  89.90  8.79  1.00 
2003 22 
Mean 65.60  54.92  10.68  0.22 
Median 54.45  45.96  8.49  0.33 
2004 49 
Mean 70.00  75.34  -5.34  0.39 
Median 60.24  52.00  8.24  0.84 
2005 8 
Mean 30.49     
Median 27.35    
2006 34 
Mean 91.88  97.06  -5.18  0.40 
Median 82.97  87.14  -4.17  0.33 
2007 75 
Mean 178.07  235.59  -57.52*** 0.01 
Median 166.70  198.88  -32.19* 0.06 
2008 58 
Mean 122.39  126.08  -3.69  0.44 
Median 28.38  33.43  -5.05  0.93 
2009 79 Mean 56.55 78.86 -22.31** 0.01 
  Median 64.11 67.98 -3.87** 0.04 
2010 299 Mean 27.98 40.92 -12.94*** -0.01 
  Median 18.38 33.64 -15.26*** 0.00 
Total 636 Mean 71.47 80.63 9.16* 0.08 
  Median 50.26 50.48 0.28* 0.09 
Data sources: China Security Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) and authors' own 
calculations. 
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Table 9: GLS Regression results for the effects of a disproportionate ownership 
structure on the initial return  
 
In this regression model, the dependent variables are the unadjusted initial return (Initial Return) 
and the market-adjusted initial return (Market-adjusted Initial Return). AGE is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the age in years of the company from the date on which it was first listed 
(with any part of a year treated as a whole year). PROCEED is the natural logarithm of the 
value of gross proceeds in the IPO. DAYLAG is the natural logarithm of the number of days 
between the offering and listing dates. Definitions of all other variables are detailed in 
Appendix A. P-values are in parentheses; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel A Unadjusted initial return as dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Initial Return 
EXCESS -0.79*** -0.52*   
 (0.01) (0.07)   
EXDUMMY   -0.15*** -0.11** 
   (0.00) (0.02) 
CASHFLOW  0.11  0.11 
  (0.52)  (0.53) 
PROCEED  -0.41***  -0.41*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
AGE  -0.02  -0.03 
  (0.50)  (0.44) 
DAYLAG  0.06  0.06 
  (0.52)  (0.53) 
P/E  0.19*  0.19* 
  (0.06)  (0.06) 
Const 1.41*** 2.95*** 1.40*** 2.96*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Board Included Included Included Included 
N 636 636 636 636 
adj. R2 0.450 0.506 0.452 0.508 
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Panel B Adjusted initial return as dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Market-adjusted Initial Return 
EXCESS -0.82*** -0.56**   
 (0.00) (0.05)   
EXDUMMY   -0.16*** -0.12** 
   (0.00) (0.01) 
CASHFLOW  0.08  0.07 
  (0.66)  (0.67) 
PROCEEDS  -0.40***  -0.40*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00) 
AGE  -0.02  -0.03 
  (0.50)  (0.44) 
DAYLAG  0.01  0.01 
  (0.89)  (0.91) 
P/E  0.21**  0.21** 
  (0.04)  (0.04) 
Const 1.43*** 2.99*** 1.42*** 2.99*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry Included Included Included Included 
Year Included Included Included Included 
Board Included Included Included Included 
N 636 636 636 636 
adj. R2 0.450 0.506 0.452 0.508 
Data sources: China Security Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) and authors' own 
calculations. 
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Figure 1: Mean post-IPO returns from one to thirty-six months after the initial 
trading month  
This figure compares the average post-IPO performance (measured by BHRs and CARs) from 
one to thirty six months after the initial IPO month of firms with and without excess control 
rights. Definitions of BHRs and CARs are detailed in Appendix A.  
Panel A: Post-IPO buy-and-hold stock returns (BHRs) of firms with and without excess control 
rights  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Post-IPO cumulative abnormal stock returns (CARs) of firms with and 
without excess control rights 
 
 
Data sources: China Security Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) and authors' own 
calculations. 
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Appendix A. Variable definitions 
Variable 
names Variable definitions 
  Post-IPO performance 
BHR 12 Twelve months post-IPO performance measured by BHR. 
BHR 24 Twenty four months post-IPO performance measured by BHR. 
BHR 36 Thirty six months post-IPO performance measured by BHR 
CAR 12 Twelve months post-IPO performance measured by CAR. 
CAR 24 Twenty four months post-IPO performance measured by CAR. 
CAR 36 Thirty six months post-IPO performance measured by CAR. 
ΔAROS Average change of ROS in the three-year post-IPO period 
ΔAGSALES Average growth rate of sales in the three-year post-IPO period. 
ΔAGEARNS Average growth rate of earnings in the three-year post-IPO period. 
ΔAOE/A Average growth in operating earnings/assets in the three-year post-IPO period. 
ΔGAOE Average growth in operating earnings in the three-year post-IPO period. 
ΔGANOI Average growth in net income in the three-year post-IPO period. 
  Disproportionate ownership structure 
EXCESS 
Ultimate controlling shareholder's control rights minus cash flow rights at the 
time of IPO 
EXDUMMY 
Dummy equals to 1 if the ultimate controlling shareholder has excess control 
rights at the time of IPO 
CASHFLOW Ultimate controlling shareholder's cash flow rights at the time of IPO 
  Control variables 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets at the time of IPO. 
LEVERAGE Total debt to total assets at the time of IPO. 
P/E Issuing P/E ratio. 
SELLING 
Dummy equals to 1 if the block holders sell their shares during the period of 12, 
24 or 36 months. 
EM 
Average pre-IPO Earnings management measured by average discretionary 
accruals of the 3 years pre-IPO period as calculated by the modified Jones 
Models developed by Jones (1991) 
Notes: Calculation of BHRs and CARs is discussed in section 3.2.1. 
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